A Mathematical Model of Dignāga’s Hetu-cakra by Jha, Aditya Kumar
Vol.:(0123456789)
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-020-00217-3
1 
A Mathematical Model of Dignāga’s Hetu‑cakra
(Within the Framework of Simon’s Bounded Rationality)
Aditya Kumar Jha1 
Received: 13 March 2019 / Revised: 13 March 2019 / Accepted: 11 August 2020 
© ICPR 2020
Abstract
A reasoned argument or tarka is essential for a wholesome vāda that aims at estab-
lishing the truth. A strong tarka constitutes of a number of elements including an 
anumāna based on a valid hetu. Several scholars, such as Dharmakīrti, Vasubandhu 
and Dignāga, have worked on theories for the establishment of a valid hetu to distin-
guish it from an invalid one. This paper aims to interpret Dignāga’s hetu-cakra, called 
the wheel of grounds, from a modern philosophical perspective by deconstructing it 
into a simple probabilistic mathematical model. The objective is to understand how 
and why a vāda based on a probabilistically weaker hetu can degrade into a Jalpa 
or vitaṇḍā. To do so, the paper maps the concept of ‘Bounded Rationality’ onto the 
hetu-cakra. Bounded Rationality, an idea coined by the management thinker Herbert 
Simon, is often employed in understanding decision-making processes of rational 
agents. In the context of this paper, the concept would state that the prativādin and 
ālocaka (debater) may not hold unbounded information to back their pratijñā (propo-
sition). The paper argues that within the probabilistically deconstructed hetu-cakra 
model, most people argue in the ‘Zone of Bounded Rationality’, and thus, the prob-
ability of a debate degrading into Jalpa or vitaṇḍā is high.
Keywords vāda · debate · Hetu-cakra · Bounded Rationality · Mathematical 
modelling
Introduction
The principal aim of a wholesome vāda is to resolve conflict around the pratijñā and 
establish ‘what is true’. One’s own thesis is defended by means of genuine criteria 
of knowledge (pramāṇa) and tarka or logic using a valid hetu (ground) and demon-
strating it with udāharaṇa (corroboration) as put forth by Dasti and Phillips (2017). 
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A vāda can degenerate into a Jalpa or vitaṇḍā when the opponent frequently and ada-
mantly uses hetvābhāsa, i.e. faulty reasoning or fallacies. One of the ways in which the 
opponent can engage in frequent use of hetvābhāsa is by using, a seemingly valid, but 
an invalid hetu in the course of the debate. To understand what constitutes an invalid 
hetu, we need to trace the development of hetu from Nyāya sutras to Dignāga. This 
will allow us to delineate the subtleties involved in establishing a valid from an invalid 
hetu: A large part of this discussion has been borrowed from Emmanuel (2013).
As per the Nyāya Sutras, hetu gives the reason or evidence through the vehicle 
of inference (anumāna). It furnishes a means to prove the proposition. For instance, 
consider the following arguments for a famously quoted example to justify the syl-
logisms in Nyaya sutras:
Proposition: Sound is non-eternal.
Ground: because of having the property of arising
Corroboration: a substance, such as pot, having the property of arising is 
non-eternal
Application: and, likewise, sound has the property of arising
Conclusion: therefore, sound is non-eternal because it has the property of 
arising
As per Emmanuel (2013), this can also be represented more generally in the form 
of:
Proposition: p has S.
Ground: p has H
Corroboration: d has H and d has S.
Application: As d has H and has S, so p has H and has S
Conclusion: p has S
An Evaluation of Hetu
Nyāya Sutras
While the hetu seems to be employed logically to defend the pratijñā in the above 
model, the hetu itself does not seem to be well defined. For instance, one can logi-
cally justify a wrong case in the same model with the following example:
Proposition: This object X is a leaf.
Ground: X is green.
Corroboration: A neem tree has leaves, and the leaves are green.
Application: Likewise, X has the property of being green.
Conclusion: X is a leaf because it is green like a tree leaf.
Clearly, the conclusion is not universally valid. A stick may be green, but that 
does not make it a leaf. In the above argument, the quality of greenness that defends 
the pratijñā is invalid because the hetu or ground must be directly related to the 
pratijñā and not merely be a correlation or co-existent. In this case, greenness is a 
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hetu that is co-existent with most leaves, but is not a sine qua non or causation for an 
object to be called a leaf as there could be leaves of different colours.
Vasubandhu’s Critique and Issues
Emmanuel (2013) points out Vasubandhu’s arguments as a counter to the above 
approach. Vasubandhu argues that for this argument structure (of the Nyāya Sutras) 
to be correct, there should be an indispensability relationship between the hetu and 
the property to be established, such as the relationship between heat and fire, such 
that one does not co-exist with the other meaning that their co-existence is indispen-
sable. One can take the following example:
Proposition: Fire is hot.
Ground: Because of emitting light.
Corroboration: Whatever emits light is observed to be hot, like a light bulb.
From this, one can abstract the following general form of argument:
Proposition: p has S
Ground: p has H
Corroboration: Whatever has H is observed to have S, like d.
Here, d is an example of something recognized to have both H and S. The prob-
lem with the above was pointed by Katsura (1986. 165) based on the three con-
ditions of hetu (tri-rūpa-hetu) which must be satisfied for it be a valid hetu: a) it 
should occur in the subject of an argument or p; b) the hetu or H should occur in 
things similar to the subject; and c) the hetu or H should not occur in things dissimi-
lar from the subject.
However, Emmanuel (2013) and Katsura (1986. 165) point out that ‘while clearly 
intended to define when the property to be established is indispensable for the 
ground’, they are stated rather imprecisely for the following reasons:
First, similarity and dissimilarity are stated with two relations, though these rela-
tions are not binary relations but, rather, ternary relations. It is not contradictory for 
one thing to be both similar and dissimilar to another.
Second, does indispensability imply exclusivity? It is not made precise whether 
or not the ground occurs in some or all of the things which are similar to the subject 
of the argument, nor whether or not the ground does not occur in some or all of the 
things which are dissimilar to the subject of the argument.
Dignāga’s Redressal of the Problem: Hetu‑cakra (Wheel of Grounds)
Dignāga addresses the problems mentioned above using a hetu-cakra, called the 
wheel of grounds. It is a 3 × 3 matrix which distinguishes a proper from an improper 
ground and is equivalent to the last two forms of the three conditions of a ground 
(tri-rūpa-hetu). The model has been adopted from Emmanuel (2013).
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Wheel of grounds
H occurs in All S All s All s
All S` No s` Some s`
H occurs in No S No s No s
All S` No s` Some s`
H occurs in Some S Some s Some s
All S` No s` Some s`
Here, the hetu is tested against all similar or dissimilar objects and validity 
is assigned only on one of the nine cases in the 3 × 3 matrix. Consider the fol-
lowing example where we assume that there are only two kinds of tea: Indian 
tea and Vietnamese tea. We would like to prove that if a tea is bitter, it must be 
Vietnamese tea. Let us use the same model employed earlier and integrate it with 
hetu-cakra:
Proposition: This tea (p) is Vietnamese tea (S).
Ground: This tea is bitter (H)
Corroboration: Comparison with Indian tea (S’)
Decoding the ground in hetu-cakra, we have the following ‘3 × 3 tea matrix’:
In all the above squares in the matrix, except the green box (all Vietnamese tea 
and no Indian tea), one cannot establish with full confidence that bitterness is a 
quintessential ground for a tea to be considered Vietnamese tea. For instance, if we 
consider Row 1 (R1), Column 3 (C3)—all Vietnamese tea, some Indian tea, it is 
clear that bitterness exists in Indian tea as well, and therefore, it is not unique to 
Vietnamese tea. Similarly, in R2, C2, since bitterness does not exist in any variety of 
tea, our pratijñā is held invalid. We will use this syllogism to model our tea matrix 
(hetu-cakra).
1 3
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 
Modelling Hetu‑cakra
Herbert Simon’s Bounded Rationality (BR) Model
Let us assume that two participants are arguing over this pratijñā, and one takes a 
side that bitterness is unique to Vietnamese tea. To make such a pratijñā, the pro-
ponent must have either tasted all kinds of tea or have accessed information about 
the taste of all kinds of tea. In most cases, it is usually unlikely that one has the 
extent of information required to make such a perfect or highly accurate pratijñā. 
A rational agent would prefer to gather all the information before he makes such 
a claim.
Herbert Simon, an influential management thinker, points out this issue in 
obtaining perfect information for an agent. He states that our decisions are ration-
ally bounded, meaning that we make decisions that are rational, but within the 
limits of the information available to us and our mental capabilities. In the above 
case, a proponent (agent) can only acquire a limited amount of information to 
make a rational pratijñā. For instance, one can make a claim in R3, C3 (some 
Vietnamese tea, some Indian tea) much more easily than that in the middle of 
the matrix, R2, C2 (no Vietnamese tea, no Indian tea) because the latter necessi-
tates access to nearly infinite or unbounded amount of information. Based on the 
information required, let us transform the tea matrix into zones of bounded and 
unbounded rationality. As clear from the discussion above, the zone of confidence 
is when one can claim his pratijñā with full confidence such as in R1, C2. On the 
other hand, the least certain or the zone of ignorance would be R3, C3 where the 
proponent only holds information about some kinds of both Vietnamese tea and 
Indian tea. Concerning the zones in between, where one needs to know the taste 
of all kinds of tea, we can classify them under Zones of Unbounded Rationality 
(UBR), and the rest can be classified under Zones of Bounded Rationality (BR). 
This is because less information is required to make such claims in the latter case. 
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Mathematical Modelling of Hetu‑cakra
Let us consider that an agent wishes to hold perfection or unbounded information 
in order to conduct a debate successfully and this optimum ideal be defined as U*. 
But, due to the nature of Bounded Rationality of an agent, as posited by Simon, one 
can only attain a satisfactory result defined here as A. Let us define the difference 
between U* and A (i.e. U*- A) to be the irrationality coefficient (assumed to be ε). 
The value of ε tends to go down in a debate as the agent gathers more and more 
information and progresses from a satisfactory status A to the optimum ideal U*. 
The lower the irrationality coefficient, the more likely it is that the agent holds more 
information and puts forth a more substantial pratijñā with a well backed hetu lead-
ing to a good debate.
To put it shortly, ε = U* − A, where U* is the optimum result and A is the aspira-
tion or satisfactory result. Satisficing options S(ε) can be defined as a set of all those 
options s such that U(s) ≥ U* − ε. Several scholars such as Bubelis (1979) prefer to 
call this model as the epsilon-equilibrium, or near Nash equilibrium, which is used 
frequently in economics and game theory. We would not be using the equilibrium-
related properties of the equation and confine ourselves to a rudimentary reading of 
the equation.
In order to understand what characterizes satisfactoriness in a debate, I propose to 
break down ε (satisfactoriness) into two components:
1. Confidence factor (c) With what confidence can the proposition be held valid? 
Only for cases when the hetu is universally valid, c tends to infinity, else c tends 
to a minimum value or even zero.
2. Information factor (i) When making the assertion, how much information does 
the debater need to gather to make a conclusive statement? For cases needing 
unbounded or perfect information, i tends to infinity, and in other cases, such as 
attaining only a satisfactory level of information, i tends either to a minimum 
value or zero.
ε is therefore a function of c and i, or alternatively, ε = f (i, c). The more informa-
tion is required and the higher is the confidence, the closer A would move to U* and 
ε would be minimized. The lesser the information base and the confidence factor, 
the farther apart A will be from U* and would push the value of ε higher.
Let us model our tea matrix as a function of i and c. The tea matrix has been 
redrawn for a convenient reference. 
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Modelling this matrix based on information factor, we get the following 
matrix. Anywhere the agent requires to taste all kinds of tea to arrive at a conclu-
sion that all or none of a particular kind of tea tastes bitter, the information factor 
would tend towards infinity because one practically needs to go through all tea 
samples or at least research about all tea samples to make a corresponding state-
ment. So, R1, C1 to R2, C2, i factor tends to infinity. In all other cases (except 
R3, C3), i factor rests between a minimum value and infinity because the agent 
does not need to taste all varieties to make that statement, such as some Vietnam-
ese tea is bitter, but no Indian tea is bitter (R3, C2). 
Modelling the tea matrix on the confidence factor is simpler, and one can 
assert with full confidence in R1, C2 that bitterness is a valid hetu for our pratijñā 
because all Vietnamese tea is bitter and no Indian tea tastes bitter. In all other 
cases, except R3, C2, confidence factor c tends to be zero because even Indian tea 
tastes bitter, and therefore, bitterness is not a quintessential quality of Vietnam-
ese tea alone. In R3, C2, there is still scope to explore more Indian tea and one 
may come across a variety that tastes bitter. Because the agent here does not hold 
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unbounded information, his confidence is not very high and he sticks to a value 
of c min.
Based on the discussion above: Optimum solution: (i, c) → ∞ where e is mini-
mized; Least satisfactory solution: (i, c) ~ (imin, 0); Satisfactory solution: imin < i < ∞ 
and c = cmin. This can be tabulated in the following matrix, and we can summarize 
our results and derive conclusion from this modelling exercise. 
Results and Conclusion
The first clear insight that one can gather from tabulating a hetu-cakra based on the 
Bounded Rationality (BR) model is that some kind of debates demand unbounded 
information. Since not all agents possess unbounded information, some debates 
should be either confined to the domain of subject experts or the scope of debate 
should be limited; otherwise, the debates would not be highly rational. An optimum 
debate is where both i and c factors are at their optimum levels. This is not very 
likely though.
Second, most people tend to argue in the Zone of Bounded Rationality (ZBR), 
and the probability of a debate degrading into Jalpa/vitaṇḍā is the highest in this 
zone precisely because the proponent does not hold enough information to substan-
tiate his pratijñā and is likely to use tools such as quibbling to win over. When UBR 
is accessible due to factors such as easy availability of information, most debates 
1 3
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 
should be of the nature of vāda and may not degenerate into vitaṇḍā or Jalpa. In 
order to conduct a successful vāda, a moderator needs to be sensitive to the bounded 
v/s unbounded nature of a debate and should confine the debate to areas where a 
good vāda can be conducted without needing to minimize the value of ε very signif-
icantly. In other words, a satisfactory debate can be organized if the debate is organ-
ized along the lines where the need for information factor (i) can be reduced, and 
participants can focus more on advancing credible arguments rather than trying to 
be perfectly rational agents.
Any such mathematical modelling is a first step into decoding the complex inter-
action of a proponent and an opponent during the course of a debate. It allows us to 
examine debates from a scientific point of view. More sophisticated models can be 
developed extending the BR model for a general case where there are more than one 
hetu (H) and where the proposition involves n number of objects (p), qualities (S) 
and corroborations (d). However, the fundamental nature of the debate that revolves 
around the establishment of a valid hetu and the information required to accomplish 
the same would not change irrespective of the sophistication of the mathematical 
model.
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